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This report was commissioned by the Commission of Inquiry Respecting the Muskrat Falls Project to 
provide the national and international context in which the Muskrat Falls Project took place.  
 
The Commission asked for the report to cover three specific topics of questions: 
1. What is the national and international context of the Muskrat Falls Project with regards to cost 
overrun and schedule overrun? 
o What are the typical cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam projects?  
o How do hydro-electric dams compare to other capital investment projects?  
o How do Canadian projects compare to other countries? 
2. What are the causes and root causes of cost and schedule overruns? 
3. What are recommendations, based on international experience and research into capital 
investment projects, to prevent cost and schedule overruns in hydro-electric dam projects and 
other capital investment projects? 
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1 Executive summary 
 
For this report we studied 274 hydro-electric dam projects, in order to place the Muskrat Falls Project 
into the context of projects in Canada and other countries.  
 
Hydro-electric dam projects are high-risk projects, with an average cost overrun of 96% (median 32%) 
and an average schedule overrun of 42% (median 27%). Cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric 
dam projects have remained constant in the last 60 years. The cost and schedule risks of dams is only 
exceeded by nuclear power projects. 
 
The data show that cost and schedule overruns are pervasive in capital investment projects. Hydro-
electric dams are no exception, neither is Canada.  
 
Often cost and schedule overruns are explained by unforeseen conditions and adverse events, e.g. 
unforeseen geology, project complexity, scope changes, bad weather. However, these are not root 
causes. The root causes of cost overruns and schedule delays can be found in optimism and political 
bias in estimates of geology, complexity, scope, weather, etc., which translate into underestimates of 
cost and schedule, which later turn into cost and schedule overruns.  
 
The data show that conventional cost and schedule estimates are biased, i.e. systematically 
underestimating cost and schedule risks. The data do not fit the “error” explanation of overrun, and 
therefore raise doubts that better models and better data, following this explanation, will improve 
forecasts. 
 
This leaves optimism and political biases as the best explanations of why cost and schedule are 
underestimated. Optimism bias and political bias are both deception, but where the latter is deliberate, 
the former is not. Optimism bias is self-deception.  
 
Project funders, owner/operators, sponsors, project managers, i.e. key decision makers, would be well 
advised to take the following steps to debias their project plans and proposals: 
• Improve project viability and risk assessments by taking an outside view of the project, disclose 
the full distributional information of forecasts, and use Reference Class Forecasting to produce 
more accurate estimates that bypass optimism and political biases. 
• Enhance project oversight by making de-biasing of projects part of the stage gate process, 
conduct independent audits and peer reviews of projects. 
• Introduce better accountability of planners and forecasters, including aligning positive and 
negative incentives to produce accurate forecasts and hold project decision makers accountable 
for project planning and delivery.  
• Enhance the transparency of project performance. Measuring and reporting project performance 
against multiple and clearly defined baselines is necessary to hold forecasters accountable for 
their forecasts, hold decision makers accountable for the quality of their decisions, hold project 
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teams accountable for their project execution and contractors accountable for their contracts. In 
reporting, special emphasis must be placed on detecting and acting upon early-warning signs so 
possible damage to the project can be identified and prevented. Better transparency is also 
needed with regards to unit cost and productivity of projects to ensure value for money.  
• The data show that major projects perform best when they are fast and modular and perform 
worst when they are slow and bespoke. Projects need to scale smartly, i.e. they need to be 
designed for economies of scale and learning, with as high an element of modularity and speed 
as possible. 
• Finally, maturity of leadership in capital investment projects is often perceived to be lacking. 
Investment in the development of project leaders, sponsors and stakeholders is necessary to 
increase the likelihood of project success. 
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2 Cost and schedule overruns 
 
In recent years, hydro-electric dam projects have again figured prominently in energy policies and 
development agendas. As critics note, hydro-electric dams are in many instances a high-risk strategy.  
 
This report will first address this critique and analyze the cost and schedule overruns of completed 
hydro-electric dam projects. This analysis uses past data on cost and schedule overruns as the best 
available predictor of cost and schedule risk of hydro-electric dams. 
 
Lastly, this section compares the cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam projects with other 
project types; and Canadian projects with projects in other countries.  
 
2.1 Cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam 
projects 
 
Our previous research (Ansar et al. 2014) was based on 245 dams, including 186 hydro-electric dam 
projects. For this report, we enlarged and updated the sample from 186 to a total of 274 hydro-electric 
dam projects1. 
 
Cost overrun is calculated as actual divided by estimated cost. Costs are measured in real terms, i.e. 
inflation is removed. The estimated cost includes all cost for the build phase of the project estimated at 
the decision to build, i.e. the full business case. Actual cost include all build cost, but not operating cost, 
measured at the commencement of revenue operations of the project.  
 
Schedule overrun is calculated as the actual divided by estimated duration of the project from the date 
of the decision to build to the commencement of revenue operations. 
 
Table 1 Cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam projects 
 
Average Median Range 
Frequency 
of overrun 
Sample size 
(n) 
Cost overrun +96% +32% -47% to +5142% 77% 269 
Schedule overrun +42% +27% -29% to +402% 80% 249 
 
The data in Table 1 show that cost overrun is more likely than not. Nearly 8 out of 10 past projects 
incurred a cost overrun.  
                                                   
1 The projects in the analysis comprise the full scope required for the operation of a hydro-electric dam, i.e. civil 
engineering works for the dam structures, electrical and mechanical installations. In most dams studied the scope 
also included changes to catchment areas, transmission lines etc. However, as the comparison with transmission 
projects in Section 2.2.2 below shows, the main source of overrun is the dam itself. 
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The data also show that on average dams nearly double their budget. The high average is influenced by 
the presence of outliers in the data. The largest overrun measured was 5,142% (Visegrad Hydroelectric 
Project 1980-1995).  
 
Outliers are projects with very high cost and/or schedule overruns. These projects are also sometimes 
called "Black Swans", a popular term for extreme events with massively negative outcomes (Taleb, 
2010). In statistical terms, Black Swans are outliers. Outliers are commonly defined to be 1.5 inter-
quartile ranges (the difference between the top and bottom quartile) away from the top quartile (Tukey 
1977). Defined in this manner, in the data of hydro-electric dam projects outliers are projects with cost 
overruns ≥ +207% and schedule overruns ≥ +127%. 10% of the observations in the data are classified 
as cost outliers defined in this manner, 6% of observations are classified as schedule outliers2. 
 
A common misconception is that Black Swans are freak occurrences to be excluded from risk analyses. 
However, managers should not ignore Black Swans, because Black-Swan projects are generally not 
caused by catastrophic risks materializing (e.g. disease outbreaks, terrorism) but are typically the result 
of multiple adverse events occurring simultaneously. Thus, while they cannot be predicted managers 
can learn from them to reduce their projects’ exposure to Black Swans.   
 
The median cost overrun in the data is 32%. Half of the hydro-electric dam projects have exceeded their 
cost estimate at the decision to build by more than 32%. The median also represents the typical hydro-
electric dam project - typically one third of the estimated cost had to be added between the decision to 
build and the commencement of operations.  
 
With regards to schedule overrun, the data show that schedule overrun is more likely than not. 8 out of 
10 past hydro-electric dams were delayed. Half the dams had a schedule overrun of more than 27%. 
Based on our data, the average schedule overrun to expect for a hydro-electric dam is 42%, the typical 
schedule overrun (median) is 27%.  
 
Further, the data show that the mean actual duration of hydro-electric dams is 100 months 
(approximately 8.3 years) and the median actual duration is 84 months (7 years), measured from the 
date of decision to build to start of commercial operations. The average delay is 27 months.  
 
Figure 1 shows that historically the average cost and schedule overruns have remained constant. The 
concerns about the high cost and schedule risk of hydro-electric dam projects are as valid today as they 
were 60 years ago. 
 
                                                   
2 2% of observations were both cost and schedule outliers. These are included in the 10% cost outliers and 6% 
schedule outliers. This shows that it is more likely that hydro-electric dams had either a large cost overrun or a 
large delay than having both. 
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Figure 1 Historic moving average of cost and schedule overruns in hydro-electric dam projects (logarithmic y-axis to account 
for outliers, 95% confidence interval of the moving average shown) 
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2.2 Comparison of hydro-electric dam projects with other 
capital investment projects 
 
This section of the report compares hydro-electric dam projects to other capital investment projects in 
transport, energy, and resource extraction (mining and oil & gas). The analysis considers whether hydro-
electric dam projects are a special type of project, with regards to cost and schedule overruns.  
 
2.2.1 Comparison with transport infrastructure projects 
 
Table 2 shows that the average cost overrun in hydro-electric dams (96%) is statistically significantly 
greater than the cost overruns in roads and bridges (24% and 32%). Hydro-electric dams have similar 
cost overrun, i.e. statistically not significantly different, to tunnel (38%) and rail (41%) projects.  
 
The frequency of cost overrun in hydro-electric dam projects is similar to the frequency of cost overrun 
in transport, where 7-8 out 10 projects have experienced cost overrun. 
 
The average schedule overrun in hydro-electric dams is 42%. In road and tunnel projects the average 
schedule overrun is statistically significantly lower (20% and 22%). The schedule risk of hydro-electric 
dam projects is similar to that of bridge (23%) and rail (48%) projects, where the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 2 Hydro-electric dam projects compared to transport infrastructure projects 
  Cost overrun 
(mean) 
Frequency of 
cost overrun 
Schedule 
overrun (mean) 
Frequency of 
schedule 
overrun Sample size (n) 
Hydro-electric 
dams 
+96% 77% +42% 80% 274 
Roads +24%*** 72% +20%*** 71% 963 
Bridges +32%* 71% +23% 74% 51 
Tunnels +38% 73% +22%** 50% 56 
Rail +41% 80% +48% 80% 308 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (p-values based on the difference between hydro-electric dam projects and 
other project types using two-sample Wilcoxon tests) 
 
2.2.2 Comparison with energy projects 
 
Table 3 compares hydro-electric dam projects to other energy projects. Dams have the second highest 
average cost overrun (average 96%). The average cost overrun of dams is statistically significantly 
higher than those of renewable projects (1% and 13%), transmission projects (8%) and statistically 
significantly higher than conventional power plants using coal, gas, oil or diesel as power source (31%).  
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The average cost overrun of hydro-electric dams are only exceeded by nuclear power projects, which 
had an average cost overrun of 122%. Again, this difference is statistically significant. 
 
Similarly, the average schedule overrun of hydro-electric dams (44%) statistically significantly exceeds 
the average schedule overruns of renewables projects (0% and 22%) and transmission projects (8%). 
The average schedule overrun of dams is statistically significantly smaller than that of nuclear projects 
(65%). The average schedule overrun of hydro-electric dams is similar to the average schedule overrun 
of thermal power generation projects (36%); the difference is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 3 Hydro-electric dam projects compared to energy projects 
  Cost overrun 
(mean) 
Frequency of 
cost overrun 
Schedule 
overrun (mean) 
Frequency of 
schedule 
overrun Sample size (n) 
Hydro-electric 
dams 
+96% 77% +44% 80% 274 
Wind power +13%*** 64% +22%* 64% 53 
Solar power +1%*** 41% -0%*** 22% 39 
Thermal (oil, 
gas, diesel, 
coal) 
+31%*** 59% +36% 76% 124 
Transmission +8%*** 40% +8%*** 12% 50 
Nuclear +122%*** 97% +65%*** 93% 191 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (p-values based on the difference between hydro-electric dam projects and 
other project types using two-sample Wilcoxon tests) 
 
2.2.3 Comparison with oil, gas and mining projects 
 
For oil, gas and mining projects, i.e. resource extraction, the sample did not include sufficient data points 
to analyze schedule overrun. The average cost overrun in hydro-electric dam projects (96%) is 
statistically significantly higher than the average overrun of 17% in resource extraction projects. 
 
Table 4 Hydro-electric dam projects compared to oil, gas and mining projects 
  
Cost overrun (mean) 
Frequency of cost 
overrun Sample size (N) 
Hydro-electric dams +96% 77% 274 
Mining, oil & gas +17%*** 60% 531 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (p-values based on the difference between hydro-electric dam projects and 
mining, oil & gas projects using two-sample Wilcoxon tests) 
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2.3 Comparison of Canadian projects with projects in other 
countries 
 
The comparison of Canadian hydro-electric dam projects with projects constructed in other countries 
(Table 5) shows that the average cost overrun is lower in Canada (41%) than it is in other countries 
(99%). Although the difference in the average cost overruns is large, variations in the data mean that it 
is not statistically significant.  
 
Schedule overrun is also lower, with Canadian hydro-electric dam projects being delayed on average by 
13% and 43% elsewhere. This difference is statistically significant. 
 
Table 5 shows that Canadian hydro-electric dam projects had a lower schedule, but not cost, overrun 
compared to the rest of the world.  
 
Table 5 Comparison of hydro-electric dam projects in Canada with other countries 
  Cost overrun 
(mean) 
Frequency of 
cost overrun 
Schedule 
overrun (mean) 
Frequency of 
schedule 
overrun Sample size (n) 
Canada +41% 50% +13%* 50% 19 
Rest of the 
world 
+99% 78% +43%* 81% 254 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (p-values based on the difference between hydro-electric dam projects in 
Canada and in other countries types using two-sample Wilcoxon tests) 
 
Table 6 compares Canadian transport, energy (excluding hydro-electric dams) and resource extraction 
(mining, oil & gas) with the same type of project in other countries. 
 
In transport and non-hydro energy projects the projects in Canada had a similar average cost overrun to 
the overrun experienced elsewhere. While the Canadian average cost overrun is slightly lower in both 
categories the difference is not statistically significant. 
  
In mining, oil and gas projects Canadian projects have statistically significantly lower cost overruns 
(Canada 13%, rest of the world 44%).  
 
When considering schedule overrun, Canadian transport projects have a statistically significantly lower 
overrun. Canadian energy projects are similar to those in other countries, with regards to schedule 
overrun (no statistically significant difference). The analysis did not have sufficient data to compare 
schedule overrun for mining, oil & gas projects.  
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Table 6 Comparison of Canadian projects with projects in other countries (transport, energy, mining, oil & gas)  
Project type Location 
Cost overrun 
(mean) 
Frequency of 
cost overrun 
Schedule 
overrun 
(mean) 
Frequency of 
schedule 
overrun 
Sample size 
(n) 
Transport 
Canada +20% 60% +4%** 42% 21 
Rest of 
world 
+29% 74% +42%** 77% 1365 
Energy 
(excluding 
hydro-
electric) 
Canada +74% 83% +46% 57% 24 
Rest of 
world 
+79% 76% +41% 74% 633 
Mining, oil 
and gas 
Canada +13%*** 56% +16% 81% 458 
Rest of 
world 
+44%*** 85% NA NA 73 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 (p-values based on the difference between Canadian projects and projects 
in other countries of the same type using two-sample Wilcoxon tests; NA = not available) 
 
2.4 Summary of the findings 
 
The key findings of the analysis were: 
- Average cost overrun of hydro-electric dam projects is 96% (median 32%) 
- Average schedule overrun of hydro-electric dam projects is 42% (median 27%) 
- Cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam projects have remained constant in the last 
60 years 
- Hydro-electric dam projects have statistically significantly higher cost overruns than road and 
bridge projects in transport; wind, solar and thermal power plant projects in energy; and mining, 
oil & gas projects. 
- Cost overrun of hydro-electric dam projects are similar, i.e. not statistically significantly 
different, to rail and tunnel projects. 
- Hydro-electric dam projects only have statistically significantly lower cost overruns than 
nuclear power plants. 
- Hydro-electric dam projects have statistically significantly higher schedule overrun compared 
with road and tunnel projects; and wind and solar power projects. 
- Hydro-electric dam projects have a similar schedule overrun as bridges and rail; thermal power 
plants (i.e. they are not statistically significantly different). 
- The only project type with statistically significantly greater schedule overrun is nuclear power. 
- With regards to cost overrun, Canadian hydro-electric dam, transport, energy projects are 
similar (i.e. not statistically significantly different) to projects in other countries 
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- Canadian cost overruns are statistically significantly lower in mining, oil & gas projects 
compared to similar projects in other countries. 
- With regards to schedule overrun, Canadian hydro-electric dam and transport projects have 
statistically significantly lower overruns as projects in other countries. 
- Schedule overruns are similar in Canadian energy projects (excluding hydro-electric dams). 
 
The data show that cost and schedule overruns are pervasive in capital investment projects. Hydro-
electric dams are no exception, neither is Canada.  
 
The data show that hydro-electric dam projects are high risk; only nuclear power plants have had greater 
cost and schedule overruns. 
 
Next, the report is going to analyze the causes and root causes of cost and schedule overruns, before 
turning to recommendations of how this situation can be improved. 
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3 Causes of cost and schedule overruns 
 
This section analyzes the causes and root causes of cost and schedule overruns. First, this section is 
going to look at the official explanations of cost and schedule overrun that were given by the Niagara 
Tunnel Project. This section is then exploring the underlying root causes in the Niagara Tunnel Project 
and other projects.  
 
3.1 Niagara Tunnel Project Case 
 
In 2004, the Niagara Tunnel Project was sanctioned by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). OPG 
estimated the 10.2 km tunnel to cost CAD 985.2 millions and to complete in the fall of 2009.  
 
In March 2013, OPG announced completion of the tunnel and declared the project in service. The actual 
outlay was CAD 1.5 billion (62% increase). Completion was delayed by 42 months against the original 
business case (OPG 2013).  
 
The original budget was informed by a quantified risk analysis. For the tunneling contract a cost 
contingency of CAD 96 million and a schedule contingency of 36 weeks were allocated to provide 90% 
certainty that the targets would be met (P90). The overall project cost contingency was set at CAD 112 
million, included in the CAD 985.2 million budget. 
 
The project was delayed on several occasions. OPG cited as reasons for the delay slower than expected 
progress of the tunnel boring machine (TBM) – 6.06 m/day instead of 14.55 m/day – due to the rock 
conditions encountered (OPG 2013, p. 70). When the tunneling contract was renegotiated in 2009, OPG 
updated the cost estimate to CAD 1.6 billion and explained: 
 
“Some of the primary drivers cited for the schedule [and cost] variances are: 
• Slower than planned TBM progress due to worse than expected conditions in the Queenston 
shale once the tunnel passed the St. Davids Gorge. 
• Expectation of continuing challenges as the tunnel ascends to higher rock strata and undertakes 
more mixed-face mining. […] 
• Restoring the tunnel to a circular profile (“profile restoration”) is an additional task that was not 
included in the original schedule. […] 
• Additional time to allow for removal of tunneling equipment before removal of the cofferdam 
at the intake structure.” (OPG 2013, pp. 112-113) 
 
OPG’s explanation of the cost increase and delay of the Niagara Tunnel Project is typical of the 
explanation provided by projects once they experience cost and schedule overruns. 
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3.2 Common causes of cost and schedule overruns 
 
Similar to the explanations given by OPG for the Niagara Tunnel Project, funders, owner-operators and 
builders of projects tend to explain cost and schedule overruns in major projects as a result of unforeseen 
ground conditions, project complexity, scope and design changes, weather, delays in site access and 
possession, delays in obtaining permits etc. (see Cunningham 2017, for a review of studies of causes of 
cost and schedule overruns). 
 
No doubt, all of these factors at one time or another contribute to cost overrun and schedule delay, but 
it may be argued that they are not the real, or root, cause. The root cause of overrun is the fact that 
project planners tend to systematically underestimate or even ignore risks of complexity, scope changes, 
etc. during project development and decision making.  
 
The root cause of cost overrun and schedule delay is not that unforeseen conditions and adverse events 
happen to a project. The root cause is found in what a project did or did not do to prepare for unforeseen 
conditions and adverse events. 
 
3.3 Root causes of cost overruns and schedule delays  
 
Most projects change in scope during progress from idea into reality. Changes may be due to uncertainty 
regarding the level of ambition, the exact corridor, the technical standards, safety, environment, project 
interfaces, geotechnical conditions, etc. In addition, the prices and quantities of project components are 
subject to uncertainty. 
 
Hence, some degree of cost and schedule risk will always exist. Such risk is however not unknown and 
should be duly estimated and reflected in the project documentation at any given stage. Hence, cost 
overruns and schedule delays should be viewed as underestimation of cost and schedule risk. 
 
Only identifying the root causes of what causes projects to underestimate cost and schedule risk allows 
planners and decision makers to address the issue. 
 
At the most basic level, the root causes of cost overrun and schedule delay may be grouped into three 
categories, each of which will be considered in turn: (1) bad luck or error; (2) optimism bias; and (3) 
strategic misrepresentation.  
 
3.3.1 Error 
 
Bad luck, or the unfortunate resolution of one of the major project uncertainties mentioned above, is the 
explanation typically given by management for a poor outcome. The problem with such explanations is 
that they do not hold up in the face of statistical tests.  
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Explanations that account for overruns in terms of bad luck or error have been able to survive for decades 
only because data on project performance has generally been of low quality, i.e. data has been 
disaggregated and inconsistent, because it came from small-N samples that did not allow rigorous 
statistical analyses. Once higher-quality data was established that could be consistently compared across 
projects in numbers high enough to establish statistical significance, explanations in terms of bad luck 
or error collapsed. The very high levels of statistical significance in Table 7 show that such explanations 
simply do not fit the data.  
 
Table 7 Tests of the "error" explanation for hydro-electric dams 
 
Mean 
Wilcoxon test, whether the 
error centers on zero 
Frequency 
of overrun 
Binomial test, whether 
overruns are as frequent 
as underruns 
Cost overrun 96% p < 0.001 77% p < 0.001 
Schedule overrun 42% p < 0.001 80% p < 0.001 
 
First, if underperformance was truly caused by bad luck and error, we would expect a relatively unbiased 
distribution of errors in performance around zero. In fact, the data show with very high statistical 
significance that the distribution does not center on zero and that the forecasting error is biased towards 
overrun.  
 
Second, if bad luck or error were main explanations of underperformance, we would expect an 
improvement in performance over time, since in a professional setting errors and their sources would be 
recognized and addressed through the refinement of data, methods, etc., much like in weather forecasting 
or medical science.  
 
Substantial resources have in fact been spent over several decades on improving data and methods in 
major project management, including in cost and schedule forecasting. Still the evidence shows (see 
Figure 1) that this has not led to improved performance in terms of lower cost overruns and delays.  
 
Bad luck or error, therefore, do not appear to explain the data.  
 
3.3.2 Optimism bias 
 
Psychologists tend to explain the underestimation of cost and schedule risks in terms of optimism bias, 
that is, a cognitive predisposition found with most people to judge future events in a more positive light 
than is warranted by actual experience. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979a, b) found that human judgment 
is generally optimistic due to overconfidence and insufficient regard to distributional information about 
outcomes.  
 
Thus people will underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, whereas they 
will overestimate the benefits of the same actions. Similarly, the cost and time needed to complete a 
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project will be optimistic, i.e. under estimated. Such errors of judgment are shared by experts and 
laypeople alike, according to Kahneman and Tversky. 
 
From the point of view of behavioral science, the mechanisms of scope changes, complex interfaces, 
archaeology, geology, bad weather, business cycles, etc. are not unknown to planners of capital projects, 
just as it is not unknown to planners that such mechanisms may be mitigated, for instance by Reference 
Class Forecasting (see below).  
 
However, planners often underestimate these mechanisms and mitigation measures, due to 
overconfidence bias, the planning fallacy, and strategic misrepresentation. In behavioral terms, scope 
changes etc. are manifestations of such underestimation on the part of planners, and it is in this sense 
that bias and underestimation are the root causes of cost overrun. But because scope changes etc. are 
more visible than the underlying root causes, they are often mistaken for the cause of cost overrun.  
 
In behavioral terms, the causal chain starts with human bias which leads to underestimation of scope 
during planning which leads to unaccounted for scope changes during delivery which lead to cost 
overrun. Scope changes are an intermediate stage in this causal chain through which the root causes 
manifest themselves.  
 
With behavioral science we say to planners, "Your biggest risk is you." It is not scope changes, 
complexity, etc. in themselves that are the main problem; it is how human beings misconceive and 
underestimate these phenomena, through overconfidence bias, the planning fallacy, etc. This is a 
profound and proven insight that behavioral science brings to capital investment planning. 
 
Behavioral science entails a change of perspective: The problem with cost overrun is not error but bias, 
and as long as you try to solve the problem as something it is not (error), you will not solve it. Estimates 
and decisions need to be de-biased, which is fundamentally different from eliminating error (Kahneman 
et al. 2011, Flyvbjerg 2008, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the problem is not even cost overrun, it is cost underestimation. Overrun is a consequence 
of underestimation, with the latter happening upstream from overrun, often years before overruns 
manifest. Again, if project planners and decision makers try to solve the problem as something it is not 
(cost and schedule overruns), you will fail. Planners and decision makers need to solve the problem of 
cost underestimation to solve the problem of cost overrun. Until these basic insights from behavioral 
science are understood, it is unlikely to get capital investments right, including cost and schedule 
estimates. 
 
3.3.3 Political bias 
 
Economists and political scientists tend to explain underreporting of budget and schedule risks in terms 
of strategic misrepresentation, or political bias (Wachs 1989, Flyvbjerg 2005). Here, when forecasting 
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the outcomes of projects, forecasters and planners deliberately and strategically overestimate benefits 
and underestimate cost and schedule in order to increase the likelihood that it is their projects, and not 
the competition's, that gain approval and funding.  
 
According to this explanation, actors purposely spin scenarios of success and gloss over the potential 
for failure. This results in managers promoting ventures that are unlikely to come in on budget or on 
time, or to deliver the promised benefits. 
 
Political bias can be traced to political and organizational pressures, for instance competition for scarce 
funds or jockeying for position, and to lack of incentive alignment.  
 
The key problem that leads to political bias is a lack of accountability for the parties involved in project 
development and implementation:  
(1) Because of the time frames that apply to major project development and implementation, 
politicians involved in producing overoptimistic forecasts of project viability in order to have 
projects approved are often not in office when actual viability can be calculated. 
(2) Special interest groups can promote projects at no cost or risk to themselves. Others will be 
financing the projects, and often taxpayers’ money is behind them, including in the form of 
sovereign guarantees. This encourages rent-seeking behavior for special interest groups.  
(3) Contractors, who are an interest group in its own right, are eager to have their proposals accepted 
during tendering. Contractual penalties for producing over-optimistic tenders are often low 
compared to the potential profits involved. Therefore, costs and risks are also often 
underestimated in tenders. The result is that real costs and real risks often do not surface until 
construction is well under way. 
 
Explanations of cost and schedule overruns in terms of political bias account well for the systematic 
underestimation of costs and schedule found in the data. A politically biased estimate of costs would be 
low, resulting in cost overrun, a politically biased estimate of schedule would be short, resulting in 
delays.  
 
Optimism bias and political bias are both deception, but where the latter is deliberate, the former is not. 
Optimism bias is self-deception.  
 
3.4 Summary of the root causes 
 
Research into the track record of past estimates (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al. 2004, Flyvbjerg 2014, 2016) shows 
that project cost and schedule estimates are systematically and consistently lower than actual outturn 
cost and actual schedule.  
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The data show that conventional, inside-view cost and schedule estimates are biased, i.e. they 
systematically underestimate cost and schedule risks. The data do not fit the “error” explanation of 
overrun and raise doubts that better models and better data on their own will improve forecasts. 
 
This leaves optimism and political bias as the best explanations of why cost and schedule are 
underestimated. 
 
As illustrated schematically in Figure 2, explanations in terms of optimism bias have their relative merit 
in situations where political and organizational pressures are absent or low, whereas such explanations 
hold less power in situations where political pressures are high.  
 
Figure 2 Optimism and Political Bias 
 
 
Conversely, explanations in terms of strategic misrepresentation have their relative merit where political 
and organizational pressures are high, while they become less relevant when such pressures are not 
present.  
 
Although the two types of explanation are different, the result is the same: inaccurate forecasts and 
inflated benefit-cost ratios.  
 
Thus, rather than compete, the two types of explanation complement each other: one is strong where the 
other is weak, and both explanations are necessary to understand the pervasiveness of inaccuracy and 
risk in project budgeting and scheduling – and how to curb it. 
  
  
20 
20 
4 Recommendations 
 
This section outlines key recommendations on how to de-bias projects based on international 
experience. 
 
4.1 Viability and risk assessments  
 
The research, discussed above, showed that the causes of cost overrun and schedule delay can be found 
within the conventional explanations of why overruns occurred: unforeseen ground conditions, project 
complexity, bad weather etc.  
 
However, as argued above, the root cause of why unforeseen conditions and adverse events turn into 
overruns can be found in optimistic or political bias in estimates. These underestimations later turn into 
overruns.  
 
Project funders, owner/operators, sponsors, project managers i.e. key decision makers in projects, should 
take the following steps to debias their project plans and proposals. 
 
4.1.1 Take an outside view 
 
The conventional “inside view” of project planning and evaluation results in optimistic estimates and 
plans. Planners and decision makers with an "inside view" focus on the constituents of the specific 
planned action rather than on the outcomes of similar actions that have already been completed, i.e. an 
“outside view”. 
 
The outside view pools lessons from past projects. In the basic form, the outside view can be taken by 
comparing the project at hand to comparable past projects with a view to learn from them. 
 
Projects are typically weak in applying lessons learned from other projects. Research has shown that 
this is linked to the perceived uniqueness of projects. When project planners perceive their project to be 
unique they implicitly exclude the experience and knowledge gained from other projects because these 
are not relevant to their project. In reality, unique projects are rare. Projects are typically specific to a 
location and a context, but they are rarely unique when looking at global experience and track record. 
 
Thus as a first step, decision makers should challenge and evaluate the quality of estimates and plans by 
taking the outside view of their project. 
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4.1.2 Probabilistic forecasts of risk  
 
Research has shown that even when project take an outside view, they tend to be biased when presenting 
projects as single point estimates, i.e. when estimates ignore the full distribution of possible outcomes. 
 
The industry standard of quantitative risk assessments has evolved to present estimates as distributions 
through Monte Carlo simulations. However, the full distributional information of these quantitative risk 
assessments is not always shared with decision makers. More importantly, Monte Carlo simulations are 
not a tool that automatically de-biases risk estimates. Monte Carlo simulations based on optimistic and 
politically biased inputs create biased forecasts. Garbage in, garbage out, here as elsewhere.    
 
During the front end, when projects are appraised, three key questions are usually considered: 
- Is the project economically viable? 
- Is the project affordable? 
- What project budget and timeline should be set? 
The risk appetite of decision makers and hence the total estimate will differ for each of these questions. 
Sponsors and funders should use probabilistic forecasts instead of single point forecasts to capture this 
reality. 
 
For example, the question of economic viability is relevant to economic appraisals of projects. For this 
question the mean of the quantitative risk assessment is the recommended measure. The mean reflects 
the expected cost, schedule and benefits of when a project, that is part of a large portfolio of investments, 
will deliver the outcome intended.  
 
When evaluating project affordability, which is a key concern not only in publicly funded projects, 
decision makers tend to require a higher degree of certainty, i.e. they have a low risk appetite. To 
evaluate the affordability, decision makers should consider a downside scenario, i.e. estimates at a high 
P-level (P80-P90). In some instances, e.g. the UK’s High Speed 2 Project, decision makers have asked 
for a 95% level of certainty of estimates (P95) to evaluate the affordability and judge whether a project 
could bankrupt departments or private sector partners. 
 
Lastly, when setting the targets for budgets and timelines decision makers need to trade-off between the 
level of certainty required and the level of challenge and ambition set for suppliers and builders of a 
project. In practice, a tiered contingency regime is becoming the standard approach to achieve this trade-
off between control and ambition. 
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Figure 3 Tiered Contingency Regime Using a Probabilistic Forecast 
 
 
The full distributional information of a forecast could be used to design a tiered contingency regime as 
shown in Figure 3. For example, a contingency regime could consist of: 
- Contract contingency up to P30: small contingency allocated to key contracts with authority 
delegated to the contract manager, setting ambitious targets for contractors with downward 
pressure on costs and demonstrating efficient use of taxpayer money; 
- Project contingency up to P50: additional contingency whose spending authority is delegated to 
the project manager and which anchors the total cost of the project at the most likely cost 
estimate; 
- Funder’s contingency up to P80: additional contingency whose spending authority is delegated 
to the project funder or project board, which covers cost above the most likely estimate and 
includes extreme downside scenarios.  
 
The key advantages of a contingency regime designed in this way are that: 
1. Contractors and contract managers are given an aspirational target. Decision makers are able to 
set ambitious goals to safeguard value-for-money and incentivize contractors to be cost efficient 
and innovative; 
2. The project is given a target in line with the likely cost, which follows common planning 
practice, i.e. uses most likely schedule and cost estimates, and holds project managers to account 
for their plans; and 
3. The funders of the project reserve a contingency reflecting their level of, typically low, risk 
appetite.  
 
Each of the three parties should also be given incentives, positive and negative (pain-gain sharing), to 
achieve their target. For example, UK Department for Transport guidance to local authorities (DfT 2011) 
states that the department first looks to local authorities to fund any cost increases above their estimate. 
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Secondly, the department will normally not consider supporting more than 75% of any cost increase. In 
effect, this sets strong incentives to local authorities with regards to the accuracy of cost risk estimates 
through establishing an approval process for cost increases and ensuring that local authorities have skin 
in the game. 
 
In another example, the regime at Heathrow’s Terminal 5 set ambitious target costs for contracts. An 
independent cost auditor verified those target costs and their achievement. Cost savings below a target 
cost were used to replenish the contingency budget; works above target cost were paid from the 
contingency. At project completion, contractors received a share of the unspent contingency as a bonus.  
 
A tiered contingency regime like those described above creates transparency about the risks taken on by 
each party working on a project. These regimes also introduce incentives that motivate each party to 
deliver according to their estimates and increases the likelihood of delivering project on budget and on 
time.  
 
4.1.3 Data-driven realistic assessments of risk with Reference Class 
Forecasting 
 
More accurate estimates and thus higher-quality project decisions combine the “outside view” and the 
use of all the distributional information that is available. This may be considered the single most 
important piece of advice regarding how to increase accuracy in forecasting through improved methods, 
according to Kahneman (2011).  
 
Reference Class Forecasting is a method for systematically taking an outside view on planned actions. 
Reference class forecasting places particular emphasis on relevant distributional information because 
such information is most significant to the production of accurate forecasts. 
 
Reference Class Forecasting makes explicit, empirically based adjustments to estimates. In order to be 
accurate, these adjustments should be based on data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere, 
and adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. 
 
Reference Class Forecasting follows three steps: 
 
1. Identify a sample of past, similar projects – typically a minimum of 20-30 projects is enough to 
get started, but the more projects the better; 
2. Establish the risk of the variable in question based on these projects – e.g. identify the cost 
overruns of these projects; and 
3. Adjust the current estimate – through an uplift or by asking whether the project at hand is more 
or less risky than projects in the reference class, resulting in an adjusted uplift. 
 
It should be noted that any adjustments to the uplift in the final step ought to be based on hard evidence 
in order to avoid reintroducing optimism back into the estimate. 
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Because Reference Class Forecasts are based on the actual outcomes of similar past projects, the method 
estimates not only the known unknowns of a project, i.e. risks identified ex-ante, but also the unkown-
unknowns for the project, i.e. risks that have not been identified but may nevertheless impact the project.  
 
4.1.4 Example of Reference Class Forecast 
 
For example, a reference class forecast of cost risk of a future hydro-electric project could be based on 
the data which were analyzed in Section 1.  
 
Step 1 – Identify a sample of past, similar projects. The analysis in Section 1 showed, while the average 
cost overrun was smaller in Canada, the difference was not statistically significant due to the variation 
in the data. Thus, no convincing statistical evidence exist that any data from other countries should be 
excluded and therefore all data points should be included to not throw out valuable information.  
 
Step 2 – Establish the risk of the variable in question. The variable in question here is cost overrun. The 
available data are sorted from smallest to largest overrun and the cumulative frequency is calculated. 
The distribution (Figure 4) shows that cost overrun up to 40% was observed in 52% of projects; and that 
a cost overrun of up to 100% occurred in approximately 80% of projects. 
 
Figure 4 Cumulative frequency of cost overrun observed in the data on hydro-electric dam projects (n=274) 
   
 
Step 3 – Adjust the current estimate. If the project is no more or less risky than similar past projects, the 
reference class forecast provides the uplift necessary to de-bias the underestimation of cost risk.  
 
To identify the necessary uplift, the data in Figure 4 are re-drawn with both axes swapped. The new x-
axis, which was the y-axis in Step 2 and which showed the cumulative of frequency of projects, now 
has a new meaning: the axis shows the level of certainty required by decision makers for the forecast. 
The new y-axis, which was the x-axis in Step 2 and which showed the size of cost overrun, is now the 
required cost uplift, i.e. the relative value of the underestimation of cost risk.  
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Figure 5 Cost uplifts to be applied to a hydro-electric project based on the desired level of certainty of decision makers (n=274) 
 
 
Figure 5 allows decision makers to choose their risk appetite by choosing the level of certainty required 
for the cost risk estimate. For example, the 50% certain estimate (P50) is 34%. Thus if the forecasted 
cost are uplifted by 34% the new budget will be met with a probability of 50% and exceeded with a 
probability of 50%, assuming that the proposed project is no more and no less risky than past, similar 
projects.  
 
The P50 estimate is often used to forecast projects in a portfolio of projects, because in this manner on 
average underruns will compensate for overruns and the portfolio will balance overall. However, for 
big, one-off capital investment projects, decision makers will typically regard a level of 50% certainty 
to be too low. In this case, decision makers would typically want estimates with a higher level of 
certainty for staying on budget, often  80% certainty (P80), i.e. estimates with a 20% probability of being 
exceeded. An 80% certain estimate, Figure 5 shows, requires an uplift of 104%. In this risk averse 
scenario, decision makers would have to apply a 104% uplift to their project proposal to ensure that the 
probability of a budget overrun is reduced to 20%. In some cases decision makers have asked for even 
higher levels of certainty than 80%, for instance 95% (P95) for UK’s High Speed 2. 
 
In practice, some decision makers are concerned about large contingencies. They fear what has been 
called the “red-meat syndrome”, i.e. that the mere fact that contingencies are available will incentivize 
behavior with contractors and others that means the contingencies will be spent. The data for hydro-
electric dams and other large projects show clearly that even large contingencies are not excessive but 
realistic. Instead of avoiding realistic contingencies projects need to put in place incentive schemes (see 
above), accountability and transparency (see below) to ensure that contingencies are spent only if and 
when needed, so the “red-meat syndrome” may be avoided. Good project leaders know how to do this. 
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4.2 Oversight 
 
Project oversight and governance are commonly executed through regular project reviews, typically at 
stage gates, which authorize funding for the next stage. Other governance meetings, e.g. steering 
committees, are used to review progress and risks, to address arising issues and to make decisions as 
needed. 
 
With regard to de-biasing project plans and decisions, the key to productive and constructive oversight  
is to provide critical challenge of project forecasts. The following recommendations focus on 
enhancements of standard governance structures and processes to de-bias projects. 
 
4.2.1 Make de-biasing part of the stage gate/approval process 
 
In 2003 the UK Government introduced the concept of Reference Class Forecasting as part of the HM 
Treasury Green Book approval process for projects. In the UK the procedure is also known as Optimism 
Bias Uplifts and typically only applied to cost estimates. Although guidance also recommends the 
application to schedule and benefits estimates, this is rarely practiced.  
 
The Green Book states: “To redress this [optimistic] tendency, appraisers should make explicit 
adjustments for this bias. These will take the form of increasing estimates of the costs and decreasing, 
and delaying the receipt of, estimated benefits. Sensitivity analysis should be used to test assumptions 
about operating costs and expected benefits” (HM Treasury 2003: 29). And further: “Adjustments 
should be empirically based, (e.g. using data from past projects or similar projects elsewhere), and 
adjusted for the unique characteristics of the project in hand. Cross-departmental guidance for generic 
project categories is available, and should be used in the absence of more specific evidence” (HM 
Treasury 2003: 29). 
 
Similarly, the Hong Kong Development Bureau started to introduce Reference Class Forecasting for 
cost estimates in 2014. The UK Government uses broad, generic reference classes available; the Hong 
Kong Government has built reference classes specific to each individual department.  
 
The key enforcing mechanism, in both the UK and Hong Kong cases, is that projects are forced to 
compare their inside view with an outside view at key approval stages. In the UK context this is at the 
approvals for Strategic Outline Business Case, Outline Business Case and Full Business Case. In Hong 
Kong the approval gates are Upgrade to Category C (inclusion in agency’s plan), Upgrade to Category 
B (completion of feasibility study), and Upgrade to Category A (final decision to build after detailed 
design and environmental impact and risk assessment). 
 
Three important points need to be considered when integrating Reference Class Forecasting with the 
stage gate/approval process for projects.  
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First, the choice of baseline from which overrun is measured is important. To de-bias cost overrun or 
schedule overrun, the reference class needs to measure the variable of interest against the same baseline 
for all projects, including the one that is being forecasted.  
 
The same baseline means that, for example, for a cost risk forecast at Outline Business Case approval, 
the reference class needs to be based on cost overrun data which measures actual cost against estimated 
cost at Outline Business Case approval. The most common error in Reference Class Forecasts is that 
data based on contract variations are used for decisions at earlier baselines (e.g. outline or full business 
case approval stage), leading to significant underestimates of cost and schedule. 
 
Second, during a project’s planning process increasing levels of detail become known to planners and 
decision makers as time passes. This often creates the expectation that risks are reducing. As the data 
above show, this is not supported by the evidence; sizeable risks remain even in full business case 
estimates and later.  
 
Thus guidance needs to be given as to how projects combine their inside and outside view risk estimates. 
The HM Treasury Green Book states: “It is good practice to add a risk premium to provide the full 
expected value of the Base Case. ... [I]n the early stages of an appraisal, this risk premium may be 
encompassed by a general uplift to a project’s net present value, to offset and adjust for undue optimism. 
But as appraisal proceeds, more project specific risks will have been identified, thus reducing the need 
for the more general optimism bias [uplift]” (HM Treasure 2003: 29).  
 
To further clarify this relationship between identified risk and optimism bias uplifts, the UK Government 
has published a guidance (HM Treasury 2015), which includes Figure 6. In the front-end process a 
project is expected to identify and plan for specific risks, thus the gap between outside (Reference Class 
Forecast) and inside view (Quantitative Risk Assessment) should be narrowing. Yet the gap will never 
fully close because a certain level of unknown risk will always be present in a project’s plan.  
 
Figure 6 Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and Reference Class Forecasting (RCF) over the lifecycle of a project (Source: 
HM Treasury Infrastructure Routemap 2015).  
 
 
Third, project data provided need to be continuously updated to adequately reflect improvements in cost 
and schedule risk estimation and project delivery. 
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4.2.2 Independent review and audits of projects 
 
The above analysis of the root causes concluded that optimism bias and political bias are both deception, 
but where the latter is deliberate, the former is not. While optimism can be addressed through taking the 
outside view, de-biasing for political bias requires additional steps. 
 
Political bias arises when agency problems are present, i.e. when principal-agent relationships are 
misaligned by hidden agendas, hidden action and/or hidden information.  
 
Incentives need to be aligned because principal and agent behavior is driven by self-interest. In order to 
receive accurate and un-biased forecasts, the principal (i.e. the project funder or owner) should introduce 
positive and negative incentives for the agent (i.e. the project forecaster) linked to the accuracy of 
forecasts.  
 
In addition, hidden agendas, hidden action and hidden information pose a hazard to the principal-agent 
relationship and may lead to political bias.  
 
In many megaprojects, government acts as both promoter of a project and the guardian of public interest 
issues for that project, such as protection of the environment, safety and of the taxpayer against 
unnecessary financial risks. These often conflicting objectives not only create conflicts of interest and 
principal-agent problems but also political bias.  
 
Project reviews and audits can surface potential political bias in projects, e.g. the suppression of bad 
news. For reviews to effectively provide checks and balances, the reviews and audits need to be 
independent, i.e. free of political bias themselves. At a minimum, this requires reviews to be independent 
of any government agency overseeing a project (e.g. reviews by the national auditor), if not independent 
from government altogether.  
 
4.2.3 Peer-review of projects 
 
The UK Government has introduced a system of peer reviews of projects to reduce the cost and reliance 
on external personnel to conduct reviews. 
 
The key advantage of these reviews is that they come from a trusted source, who has knowledge of how 
projects are delivered within the local government context. The reviews have sufficient independence 
to surface key issues and their informal, i.e. partly unminuted, nature means that thorny issues can be 
discussed.  
 
In effect, the peer reviews bring an outside view to the project and thus offer an opportunity to spot signs 
of optimism and political biases. 
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4.3 Accountability 
 
In addition to better oversight and independent reviews, principles of good accountability and 
transparency can help to address potential principal-agent problems right from the start, in order to 
prevent bias in estimates and forecast in the first place. 
 
4.3.1 Skin-in-the-game by forecasters 
 
In many projects forecasters are not accountable for the accuracy of forecast they produce. Incentives 
are often not in place to ensure that their forecasts are accurate. In most projects, incentives actually 
encourage inaccurate forecasts.  
 
For example, if in a project the forecasters are paid upon successful project approval, they have strong 
incentives to introduce political bias into the project, which increases the chances of funding by 
overestimating the benefits and underestimating the cost of projects. For example, deliberately slanted 
forecasts have been reported in a quarter of demand forecasts for rail projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). 
 
Similarly, when project promoters want to increase the chance of funding their incentives are stacked in 
favor of underestimating cost and timelines in order to attract funding. 
 
When contracts are awarded fully or with a high weighting on low price, contractors are incentivized in 
favor of underestimating cost and timelines in order to win contracts. 
 
The court case between Macquarie and Syncora (Syncora Guar. Inc. v Alinda Capital Partners LLC, 
2017) exposed that Macquarie paid success fees to Maunsell, the traffic forecaster in this case, for the 
successful issuance of bonds by Syncora. The court ruling quotes a witness describing this as unsettling 
behavior, yet did not award punitive damages in this case.  
  
In similar lawsuit, AECOM, the forecasters of the bankrupt Clem Jones Tunnel in Australia, settled a 
claim over misrepresented forecasts for AUD 280 million (Stacey 2015). 
 
What these cases show is that forecasters need to be held accountable for the accuracy of their forecasts. 
The cases also show that this should not only be a consideration after a project has failed, but 
accountability should be built into the forecasters’ incentives and obligations right from the start of the 
planning process. 
 
4.3.2 Accountability of decision makers and project managers 
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Accountability of decision makers and politicians tends to be a problem, particularly to hold those 
responsible for scope decisions accountable for scope creep in projects, which is a major cause of cost 
and schedule overruns.  
 
In 2014, the UK Government changed the accountability structure of its public projects. Previously, if 
a project breached the authorized expenditure limit, the Parliament’s Select Committee, which is 
ultimately responsible for authorizing funding, only interrogated civil servants on behalf of their 
ministers.  
 
Parliament introduced a change to committee rules, so that committees can insist on hearing evidence 
from named officials, i.e. civil servants, even against the wishes of the responsible minister. This rule 
change made Senior Responsible Officer of the project, i.e. the senior project managers, directly 
accountable to Parliament. 
 
4.4 Transparency  
 
4.4.1 Reporting of project performance 
 
During delivery, effective governance needs to provide constant challenge and control of the project. 
To provide adequate challenge and control, the governance bodies need to receive unbiased and up-to-
date information about project performance compared to its baseline. Thus reporting enables problem 
solving, including quickly getting the project back on track, whenever it begins to veer off course.  
 
Effective governance relies on multiple channels of information to senior decision makers; for example, 
data-driven reports on project performance and forecasts combined with reports by the management 
team and independent audits (Flyvbjerg and Kao 2014).  
 
In reports, special emphasis must be placed on detecting early-warning signs that cost, schedule and 
benefit risks may be materialising, as they tend to do, so damage to the project can be prevented. When 
early-warning signs emerge, projects should revisit their assumptions and reassess cost and schedule 
risk and review optimism bias forecasts. 
 
During project execution, cost and schedule variation are typically reported against the latest approved 
baseline. The practice aims to hold contractors accountable for the contracts they signed and hold project 
management accountable for their most recent plan to complete the project. 
 
This practice ensures accountability during delivery, however, it should be extended to the planners and 
forecasters. Planners and forecasters should be held accountable for their forecasts by measuring and 
reporting the extend of underestimation or overestimation in their forecasts.  
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Similarly, the quality of decision making can only be revisited and improved when decision makers are 
held accountable for the data they based their decision on.  
 
Measuring and reporting project performance against multiple and clearly defined baselines is needed 
to hold forecasters accountable for their forecasts, hold decision makers accountable for the quality of 
their decisions, hold project teams accountable for their project execution and contractors accountable 
for their contracts. Only then can enhancement and improvement of forecasting take place. 
 
In addition, one of the largest challenges of using better forecasting methods, such as Reference Class 
Forecasting, is the lack of high-quality data. Thus owners and funders should make baseline and progress 
data internally available. 
 
4.4.2 Reporting of cost effectiveness of projects  
 
When projects are held accountable for meeting budget and timeline targets, incentives are created to 
increase budgets. While contingencies are always needed and unbiased analysis shows that 
contingencies need to be larger than typically applied, in theory, creating transparency about cost and 
schedule overruns might lead to projects inflating their estimates above a reasonable level. 
 
Taking the outside view and Reference Class Forecasting, as described above, can establish what 
reasonable levels of contingency are. 
 
In addition, Reference Class Forecasting could be applied to the value-for-money question, i.e. to unit 
cost estimates. This could provide a safeguard against unreasonably inflated cost estimates. Similarly, 
Reference Class Forecast applied to planned productivity could safeguard against unreasonably inflated 
schedule estimates. 
 
Further, incentives schemes for unit cost and productivity targets could be based on the same logic of 
tiered contingency regimes, described above, when the analysis is applied to unit cost and productivity 
estimates. Targets set based on de-biased estimates and full distributional information better balance 
realism and ambition.  
 
Thus, public sector organizations, should at the very least share internally with their planners the 
underlying unit cost in their projects to provide data for better inside view forecasts.  
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4.5 Other recommendations 
 
4.5.1 Smart scaling 
 
Our analysis of hydro-electric projects shows (Ansar et al. 2017) that long construction times are 
associated with higher cost overruns. The implication is to build as fast as possible. However, in order 
to go fast during construction more consideration needs to be given to this during the planning phase. 
Shortening the planning phase to shorten the project duration leads to project failure. Instead, projects 
need to go slow to go fast. 
 
In addition to slowness, one-off projects perform worse. Case studies, e.g. the Madrid Metro extension 
by Manuel Melis, show that the best way to build large projects is to make them modular and deliver 
modules as fast as possible. Modularization within a larger program of work, like the Madrid Metro, 
leads to better economies of scale and, more importantly, better economies of learning.  
 
4.5.2 Masterbuilder development 
 
In many countries, the career development of project managers is hampered by the lack of recognition 
of the project delivery profession. Career advancement and development of civil servants tends to be 
tied to policy development but not delivery. In addition frequent turn-over of civil servants in project 
roles leads to loss of capabilities and limited opportunities for learning and development of project 
management specialists (Brown 2013). 
 
Thus, the maturity of project leadership in the public sector is perceived to be lower than the leadership 
in the private sector partners delivering a project. This points to the need to equip project managers to 
effectively and efficiently lead major projects. For example, the UK government has invested in the 
Major Projects Leadership Academy; the Hong Kong government has a similar programme as part of 
the Civil Service College. 
 
In addition, a key practical challenge is that top-management governance bodies often include 
representatives without prior experience in managing major projects. Thus, effective communication 
between the project and its governance bodies becomes a challenge. Closing this capability gap requires 
not only capability building on the side of the project managers but also the project sponsors. 
 
4.5.3 Private finance 
Public financing and financing with a sovereign guarantee are often seen as less costly and less risky 
than private finance, because of the lower risk premium involved in the former type of financing 
compared with the latter. However, public financing or financing with a sovereign guarantee does not 
reduce risk or costs of risk. It only transfers risk from lenders to taxpayers and is likely to increase the 
total risks and costs of a project.  
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The decision to go ahead with a project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the 
willingness of private financiers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one third of the 
total capital needs. This could result in more realistic risk assessment, a possible reduction of risk and a 
shift in risk from ordinary citizens to groups better able to protect themselves against risk. The pressure 
on performance would be higher as lenders and possible shareholders and stock market analysts would 
monitor the project.  
 
The participation of risk capital does not mean that government gives up or reduces control of the 
project. On the contrary, it means that government can more effectively play the role it should be 
playing, namely as the ordinary citizen’s guarantor for ensuring concerns are met about safety, 
environment, economics and distribution of risk. 
 
 
4.6 Summary of the Recommendations 
 
The data on hydro-electric dam projects and other projects, in Canada and elsewhere, show that a 
project’s cost and schedule are frequently and systematically underestimated. The root causes of these 
underestimations can be found in optimism and political biases.  
 
Planners, owners and decision makers can take steps to de-bias their projects up front and during project 
delivery. 
 
One reason why unchecked optimism bias persists in many projects is that they are planned and managed 
with an inside view. Projects should take an outside view and compare the project to the experience of 
similar, past projects in order to guide planning and decision making.  
 
In addition, to counter optimism bias, decision-makers should consider the full distributional 
information for relevant outcomes like cost and schedule. Decision makers should set multiple goals 
and targets according to their risk appetite for each goal. Thus projects can be ambitious where optimism 
is merited and conservative where realism is needed. 
 
Reference Class Forecasting is a method to systematically take the outside view by using data from 
previous projects and thus bypassing optimism and political bias.  
 
Additional steps are needed to correct political bias. The cause of political bias is found in principal-
agent relationships, which are motivated by self-interest.  
 
Stage-gate approvals during project planning and delivery should mandate steps to de-bias estimates; 
independent and peer reviews also help in surfacing signs of optimism and political biases. 
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Project planners and managers need to be held accountable for the plans and estimates they produce, 
just as structures and processes are in place to hold contractors accountable for their contracts. This 
should be done by introducing positive and negative incentives for planners and forecasters to produce 
accurate estimates. International experience shows that project accountability is often diffuse, thus the 
accountability placed on policy makers and planners should be extended to the project leaders delivering 
projects.  
 
A further recommendation to reduce the likelihood of adverse principal-agent relationships is 
transparency. Enhancements in project reporting are needed, especially consistent measurement against 
baselines and tracking for early-warning signs that things are going wrong. This enables problem 
solving, including quickly getting the project back on track, whenever it begins to veer off course, which 
invariably happens. 
 
However, greater internal transparency about cost and schedule overruns might create incentives to pad 
project budgets and timelines. Better forecasting methods, such as Reference Class Forecasting, suggest 
realistic contingencies. Extending the application of Reference Class Forecasting to unit cost and 
productivity estimates allows setting realistic targets and aligns incentives to ensure projects deliver 
value for money. 
 
The data show that the best approach to deliver projects on budget is to deliver them on time, in as short 
a time as possible. However, to accelerate project delivery projects need to plan more carefully – 
shortening project durations by cutting planning short will, most likely, backfire. In addition to 
delivering projects fast, project approaches need to be chosen for economies of scale and learning. Smart 
scaling of projects, i.e. delivery at speed and with a high degree of modularization, implements both 
strategies and de-risks projects. 
 
Finally, the maturity of project leadership, especially in the public sector, is often perceived to be low. 
Thus project leaders need to be equipped to effectively and efficiently lead projects, which often are 
technically, structurally or politically difficult to manage. Similarly, project sponsors and decision 
makers need to be equipped with the needed capabilities to understand and challenge projects in order 
to provide effective oversight. 
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